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Introduction
IMAGINE A NEWLY ESTABLISHED petroleum refinery in the midst
of contract negotiations with a union. Approaching the sixtieth day of
contract talks, the sides cannot agree on wages. The employer argues
that because he has incurred considerable debt in opening the plant,
he cannot afford to bring his employees up to the same salary as employees at other, longer-established refineries. The employer is confident that his position will succeed, and that the union will accept his
counter offer of a significant pension plan. However, just prior to the
negotiations deadline, the union insists on both industry-standard
wages and pensions. Pursuant to federal law, an arbitrator steps in,
listens to the evidence, and eventually decides that he believes the refinery can afford to pay standard wages. The arbitrator awards the
wages and pension plan the union desires, and also an increase in
vacation and sick time that the parties had agreed was off the table.
The arbitrator issues his decisions without explanation. Unable to lay
off the crucial employees in the bargaining unit, the refinery is forced
to relocate.
The process described in the hypothetical above is called "interest arbitration": the creation of a collective bargaining agreement by a
neutral third party in an attempt to create terms which are fair to both
sides.' When interest arbitration is legally mandated, one or both parties may feel aggrieved by the result, and wish to challenge the terms
*
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of the collective bargaining agreement. In the above hypothetical, the
company might argue that the arbitrator ignored evidence, or the parties' positions prior to arbitration, in formulating an award. A provision of the Employee Free Choice Act ("EFCA"), 2 a proposed act of
Congress, would mandate interest arbitration of initial collective bargaining agreements when the union and the employer cannot agree
on a contract within a prescribed period of time. 3 The EFCA, however, does not provide courts guidance on how to review the collective
bargaining agreements it would mandate.
On its own, the EFCA is inadequate to meet the needs of employers and unions who will be affected by its compulsory arbitration provisions. The EFCA's first-contract compulsory arbitration provisions
will lead unions to become reliant on an arbitrator to resolve their
contract disputes, yet the EFCA does not specify a standard or scope
for judicial review of interest arbitration awards. 4 Because federal
courts have not developed a body of law to address the review of labor
union contracts, the EFCA should be amended to require that (1)
courts conduct arbitrations in on-the-record hearings; (2) courts vary
the level of deference accorded to interest arbitration awards, based
on the arbitrator's expertise; and (3) arbitrators craft awards according to a prescribed set of substantive standards.
Part I of this Comment discusses the frustrated legal landscape
that newly unionized employees face in negotiating a contract with a
recalcitrant employer, defines interest arbitration and its traditionally
limited role, and explains why Congressional Democrats have proposed compulsory interest arbitration as a solution to bad-faith bargaining by employers. Part II argues that the EFCA will lead parties to
fall back on interest arbitration to award them a contract, instead of
attempting to bargain for one. Part III examines why federal judicial
policy surrounding arbitration of disputes under a pre-existing collective bargaining agreement and existing standards for judicial review of
administrative decisions are, by themselves, inadequate tools for effectively reviewing interest arbitration awards. Part IV of this Comment
examines Canadian law and state law concerning judicial review of
interest arbitration decisions, and suggests that Congress adopt Canada's flexible approach to agency review, and the kinds of substantive
standards that states require arbitrators to use in creating a contract.
2.
3.
4.

S. 1041, 110th Cong. § 3 (2007).
Id.
See id.
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I.

The Employee Free Choice Act's Remedial Role in Federal
Labor Law

A.

Current Law: The National Labor Relations Act's Limited
Ability to Promote Collective Bargaining

Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), the
federal act which governs private-sector union-employer relations,
provides that while a union and an employer are required to bargain
in good faith over the terms and conditions of employment to be set
forth in a collective bargaining agreement, "such obligation does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession . . . .- 5 The Supreme Court expressly limited the right of
the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") to set the substantive
terms of a collective bargaining in any way, even as a remedy for a
violation of the NLRA. 6 In doing so, Justice Black announced the fundamental policy of the NLRA with respect to the government's role in
collective bargaining:
It was recognized from the beginning that agreement might in
some cases be impossible, and it was never intended that the Government would in such cases step in, become a party to the negotiations and impose its own views of a desirable settlement. This
fundamental limitation was made abundantly
clear in the legisla7
tive reports accompanying the 1935 Act.
The reason for this "fundamental limitation" is that the NLRA was not
meant to set the terms and conditions of employment, but was instead
meant to allow employers and employees to work together to establish
mutually acceptable conditions of employment.8 In upholding the
NLRA's constitutionality under the doctrine of substantive due process, the Court stated that the NLRA gives the NLRB no ability to
mandate labor contracts. 9
In deciding that the NLRA was not intended to set the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement, the Court acknowledged the tension
between this restriction and "a practical enforcement of the principle
that [the parties] are bound to deal with each other in a serious at5. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2008).
6. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 107-09 (1970) (holding that the NLRB has
broad power to effectuate the policies of the NLRA, but may not do so in a way that interferes with the freedom to contract of either the union or the employer).
7. Id. at 103-04.
8. See id. at 104 n.2.
9. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 25, 43-46 (1937).
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tempt to resolve differences and reach a common ground." 10 There is
no legal guarantee of a speedy collective bargaining process, or even
the eventual production of a contract. Therefore, as long as a party
avoids overt "bad faith" conduct, such as insistence upon permissive
bargaining topics," that party may engage in so-called "surface bargaining"'12 with impunity. On the effects of surface bargaining, Professor Archibald Cox said that "[t] he bargaining status of a union can be
destroyed by [an employer] going through the motions of negotiating
almost as easily as by bluntly withholding recognition [of the
union]."13 Other examples of bad faith bargaining methods are lim-

ited to extreme conduct like "regressive bargaining"1 4 or insistence on
exclusively unilateral control of all terms. 15 Bad faith cannot be de6
duced simply from the unreasonableness of the suggested terms.'
The effect of these rules is that a contract is rarely produced in
the face of a recalcitrant employer.17 Even where the employer violates the duty to bargain in good faith, the usual remedy-an NLRB
order to resume bargaining-has a low enough cost to justify the ille10. NLRB v. Ins. Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 486 (1960) (holding that the
requirement that the parties bargain for a contract "in good faith" was not violated when a
union engaged in certain planned, concerted on-thejob activities designed to harass the
employer).
11. See NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1958) (holding that mandated acceptance of permissive bargaining proposals as a condition precedent to any
agreement constitutes bad faith).
12. Surface bargaining is defined as "sitting at the table but making no active effort to
reach agreement with a view toward forcing the union to contemplate a strike knowing
that the employer has the right to hire permanent strikebreakers." Roy Adams et al., The
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation: Linking Labor Standards and Rights to Trade
Agreements, 12 Am. U. J. ILNr'L L. & POL'Y 815, 832 (1997).
13. Archibald Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1401, 1413
(1958).
14. Regressive bargaining occurs when "an employer withdraws a bargaining proposal
on which tentative agreement has been reached and, in its place, substitutes a regressive
proposal" without good cause for doing so. Valley West Health Care, Inc., 312 N.L.R.B.
247, 252 (1993), enforced, 67 F.3d 307 (9th Cir. 1995).
15. See NLRB v. A-1 King Size Sandwiches, 732 F.2d 872, 877-88 (lth Cir. 1984)
("[T] he Company insisted on unilateral control over virtually all significant terms and conditions of employment, including discharge, discipline, layoff, recall, subcontracting and
assignment of unit work to supervisors.").
16. NLRB v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 407-09 (1952) (holding that proposals
"touching any condition of employment without regard to the traditions of bargaining in
the particular industry" are not per se violations of the NLRA).
17. Paul C. Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospectsfor Union
Representation, 98 HIARv. L. REv. 351, 361-62 (1984) [hereinafter Weiler, Striking a New
Balance].
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gality when the employer feels it benefits him. 18 Unions, however,
take a much greater risk when they attempt to pressure an employer
into bargaining. The NLRA does protect some concerted activities,
like strikes 19 and work slowdowns. 20 Yet other tactics, like refusing to
perform some work duties or engaging in a sit-down strike,2 ' are not
protected. 22 During negotiations, an employer may not unilaterally
implement bargaining proposals, such as wage decreases, before bargaining has reached an impasse. 23 A genuine impasse only exists when
one of the parties presents a final proposal on an issue like employee
wages, health benefits, or other areas of critical importance to the employees' ability to work, 24 and the other side rejects it without hope of
further negotiation. 25 In the case of a drive for a first-time collective
bargaining agreement, this merely means that the status quo of wages
remains in effect during the course of bargaining. Even if the employees successfully force an employer into a genuine bargaining impasse,
they risk being supplanted by replacement workers while they engage
27
in a protected strike. 26 When the strike ends, replaced employees
18. Richard N. Block, Rethinking the National Labor Relations Act and Zero-Sum Labor
Law: An IndustrialRelations View, 18 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 30, 37 (1997).
19. A "strike," as defined in section 142 of the Labor Management Relations Act, includes "any strike or concerted stoppage of work by employees (including a stoppage by
reason of the expiration of a collective-bargaining agreement) and any concerted slowdown or other concerted interruption of operations by employees." 29 U.S.C. § 142(2)

(2008).
20. The NLRA provides that employees have a right "to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." Id.
§ 157. Striking employees have the same rights. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304
U.S. 333, 347 (1938). The NLRA also provides that "nothing in this [Act], except as specifi-

cally provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or
diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that
right." 29 U.S.C. § 163. The term "strike" is defined to include work slowdowns. Id.
§ 142(2).
21. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 252 (1939) (noting that the
seizure and retention of an employer's property was clearly unlawful).
22. See Vencare Ancillary Servs. Inc. v. NLRB, 352 F.3d 318, 323-25 (6th Cir. 2003). At
issue in Vencare were so-called "partial strikes." Id. at 322.
23. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962).
24. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 500-01 (1979) (holding that the
choice of a cafeteria food service provider at an automotive plant vitally effects employee
interests).
25. SeeTaft Broad. Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967), enforced, 395 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (noting that an impasse occurs "after good-faith negotiations have exhausted the
prospects of concluding an agreement," and is "a matter of judgment").
26. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2008) defines "employee" to include "any individual whose
work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or
because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and
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must either wait for new jobs to open up, or for their old ones to be
vacated by the replacement employees. 28 Therefore, in order to gain
the benefits that the NLRA is meant to provide, workers are often
forced to wager theirjobs on their own ability to force the employer's
hand into bargaining. The firings, discipline, and ill-will that such a
process produces destabilizes the union's base of support 29 and could
lead to the eventual decertification of the union as the employees'
bargaining representative. Thus, it is usually in the employer's interest
to avoid impasse, provoke the union to engage in illegal or unprotected concerted action like sit-down or partial strikes, and then resolve the contract on more favorable terms than it would obtain by
trading concessions with the union.
B.

Interest Arbitration: The Alternative to Traditional Bargaining

"'Interest arbitration' in labor matters involves the submission of
disputes over terms for a new collective bargaining contract to an independent third party who determines what the new terms of the contract will be."'30 Interest arbitration is distinct from grievance
arbitration, where the arbitrator merely decides a dispute by interpreting and applying an existing union contract (a collective bargaining
agreement).31 Whereas the decisions of a grievance arbitrator result
in binding interpretations of the contract itself, the decisions of an
32
interest arbitrator result in the award of a legally binding contract.
There are two basic types of interest arbitration. In conventional
interest arbitration, the neutral arbitrator hears all of the evidence
and uses his or her own judgment to create a binding contract between the parties. 33 In final offer arbitration, the arbitrator must
34
choose between final proposals by each party on the disputed issues.
substantially equivalent employment." Id.; see also NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S.
375, 381 (1967) (noting that a striker remains an employee until he has obtained other
regular and substantially equivalent employment).
28. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. at 380-81.
29. See Weiler, Striking a New Balance, supra note 17, at 361-62.
30. Chi. Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chi. Newspaper Publishers' Ass'n, 853 F.2d
506, 509 n.6 (7th Cir. 1988).
31. Joseph R. Grodin, PoliticalAspects of Public Sector Interest Arbitration, 64 CAL. L. REv.
678, 678 n.1 (1976).
32. Id.
33. Arvid Anderson & Lauren Krause, Interest Arbitration: The Alternative to the Strike, 56
FORDHNm L. REv. 153, 157 (1987).

34. Id. at 157. See generally Robert G. Howlett, Interest Arbitration in the Public Sector, 60
CHI.-KErT L. REv. 815 (1984) (discussing experts' views on the success of various types of
interest arbitration procedures).
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Some jurisdictions employ hybrid approaches such as permitting arbitrators to choose between final offers on an issue-by-issue basis only
for certain issues, or allowing them to choose a "package" of issues
35
that may even encompass all the terms of the contract.
An arbitrator's choice of contract terms are therefore closely
analogous to a legislative process. 3 6 Interest arbitration is commonly
used by state legislatures to set the terms of public employee contracts
in the face of bargaining impasses. 3 7 For example, in 1983 Ohio enacted the Ohio Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act to end a
harmful cycle of "strikes and [employer] reprisals."3 8 While it would
be possible for the Legislature to step in and determine the terms of
any collective bargaining agreement, this is often done by selection of
39
an individual arbitrator or panel of arbitrators.
The idea of private-sector compulsory interest arbitration statutes
runs counter to the traditional idea of when interest arbitration
should be employed. Interest arbitration has been accepted in the
case of public employees because they have no right or at least a very
limited right to strike, 4° or in many cases even to sit down at the bargaining table with their employer. 41 It has been argued that the success of collective bargaining requires either the right to strike or
compulsory arbitration, but not both. 42 Interest arbitration has been
used as a "means of enhancing the personal dignity of [public] employees by providing them with a formal process for participating in
the determination of their basic employment conditions," when those
43
means would otherwise be absent.
35.

Anderson & Krause, supra note 33, at 157-58.
36. Id. at 153.
37. Charles Craver, Public SectorImpasse Resolution Procedures,60 CHI.-KENr L. REv. 779,
783-84 (1984) [hereinafter Craver, Public Sector Impasse].
38. James T. O'Reilly, Ohio Strikes Back: Constitutional Invalidation of Labor Settlement
Procedures,57 U. CIN. L. REv. 1351, 1351 (1989).
39. See, e.g., City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Ass'n, 256 A.2d 206, 208
(R.I. 1969) (noting that Rhode Island interest arbitration law allowed the appointment of a
three-member panel, comprised of one member from the union, one from the municipality, and a third member either agreed upon or appointed by the ChiefJustice of the Rhode
Island Supreme Court).
40. See Howlett, supra note 34, at 816.
41. Janet Currie & Sheena McConnell, The Impact of Collective-BargainingLegislation on
Disputes in the US. Public Sector: No Legislation May Be the Worst Legislation, 37 J.L. & ECON.
519, 522 (1994) (discussing "no duty to bargain" jurisdictions).
42. Anderson & Krause, supra note 33, at 155.
43. Craver, Public Sector Impasse, supra note 37, at 787; see also id. at 802-03 (discussing
the sources of public employees' frustrations).
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The Remedial Purpose of the Employee Free Choice Act's
Compulsory Interest Arbitration Provisions

The Employee Free Choice Act, a bill sponsored three separate
times in Congress, 44 would significantly change the nature of union
certification and collective bargaining in the United States. Each version of the Act, including the 2007 version currently pending in the
Senate, would provide for first-contract 4 5 arbitration in cases where
mediation has otherwise failed. 4 6 The bill has had wide support: the
2007 version had forty-seven co-sponsors in the Senate. 47 Under the
2007 version, ten days following the receipt of a newly organized labor
organization's or newly certified representative's request to collectively bargain, the. parties are supposed to begin good-faith bargaining. 48 If the parties have not reached an agreement on a contract
within ninety days of the beginning of bargaining, the dispute is referred to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service ("FMCS")
for mediation. 49 If mediation is not successful in resolving the parties'
dispute, the dispute is sent to an arbitration board to be established by
the FMCS. 50 The arbitrators' decision binds the parties for a period of
two years, during which time the parties may amend the contract only
51
by "written consent of the parties."
A handful of explicit references to the mandatory arbitration provisions litter the most recent House debate.5 2 In the few places where
the mandatory arbitration provisions are mentioned, the members of
Congress who support them do so by pointing to the remedial effect
that an arbitration process will have on an otherwise frustrated union
landscape: "Today, you get harassed, you get intimidated, you get an
election, and after the election, you get appeals. And you get endless
44. The amendment would be codified in section 8(h) of the NLRA. S. 1041, 110th
Cong. § 3 (2007). The 2005 version of the Act is found at S. 842, 109th Cong. (2005). The
2003 version of the Act is found at S. 1925, 108th Cong. (2003).
45. "First-contract" refers to a first-time collective bargaining agreement.
46.
47.

S. 1041 § 3; S. 842 § 3; S. 1925 § 3.
S. 1041.

48.

S. 1041 § 3.

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 153 CONG. REc. H2055-56 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2007). The majority of the debate in
the House of Representatives concerned the Act's first provision, which would allow the
NLRB to certify a union showing majority support through signed, valid authorization
cards.
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waitbargaining that in our own State of California, people have been
53
"
election.
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union
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ing 7, 8, 9 years
Labor statistics support this description. Union density, the percentage of the private non-agricultural workforce that is union members, declined from a high of 35% in 1954 to a little over 20% by
1980.54 The overall success rate for unions attempting to win certification elections plunged from 73% in 1955 to 37% in 1980.55 The overall success of certified unions in negotiating first contracts declined as
well, from 86% of newly certified unions signing contracts in 1955 to
63% in 1980.56 At the same time that unions were becoming less successful, instances of illegal employer tactics were on the rise. Charges
alleging discriminatory anti-union conduct by the employer "rose
from under 3,100 to over 18,300 between 1955 and 1980." 5 7 During

the same period, charges of employer violations of the duty to bargain
in good faith rose from 1200 to 10,000.58 While a general shift in atti-

tudes towards unions themselves may be to blame for a portion of
these declines, the numbers nevertheless show that by 1980, unions
that vied for certification achieved their ultimate goal-a contractless than one quarter of the time.
The major argument in favor of amending the NLRA to include
the EFCA is that the policies that shape our current system of collective bargaining date back to a time when labor was a far more vital
institution than it is today, and far more capable of succeeding in collective bargaining. Awarding unions with majority support the benefits
of a contract could be considered the fruits of their labors, equal to
winning a certification election or gaining voluntary recognition from
the employer. This argument appeals to a sense of fairness, the idea
that workers unionize for better conditions and are not able to
achieve them under the current statute. 59 Thus, the balance of power
that the NLRA originally struck would be righted by compulsory interest arbitration.
53. Id. (statement of Rep. Miller).
54. Paul C. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers'Rights to Self-Organization Under the
NLRA, 96 I-IARv. L. REv. 1769, 1771 (1983).
55. Weiler, Striking a New Balance, supra note 17, at 353 tbl.1.
56. Id.
57. PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENTrr LAW

238 (1990).

58. Id.
59. See StrengtheningAmerica's Middle Class Through the Employee Free Choice Act: Hearing
on H.R 800 Before the Subcomm. on Health, Employment, Labor and Pensions of the Comm. on
Education and Labor, 100th Cong. 61-62 (2007) (statement of Nancy Shiffer, Attorney, AFL-

CIo).
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Compulsory Interest Arbitration's Effect: Leading the
Parties Away from Hard Bargaining and into Reliance
on the Arbitrator

Scholars have extensively debated the question of whether compulsory interest arbitration has an overall negative or positive effect on
unions and employers. Supporters of the EFCA might point to the fact
that compulsory interest arbitration tends to decrease the costs to
both parties. 60 These include not just the cost of actually sitting at the
bargaining table, but also the personnel costs and loss of good faith
associated with economic warfare between the parties (such as strikes,
lockouts, and so on). A state-mandated first-contract helps the union
achieve satisfactory terms that will increase an employee's desire to
bargain in the future. 6 1 Another benefit of compulsory first-contract
arbitration is the "face-saving" effect both parties experience. 62 When
neither party is forced to make concessions during the normal bargaining process, neither party can be accused of selling out its
constituency.
For the same reasons, under the EFCA, the parties will be more
likely to fall back on interest arbitration instead of attempting to agree
to a contract through negotiations. In many current bargaining scenarios, the relative strengths of the parties' overall bargaining positions
will determine the course of the negotiations and the eventual terms
of the agreement. 6 3 Those strengths may be based in part on the economic situation of the employer and the individual employees, but
may also be affected by the parties' levels of organization and tactical
sophistication. A strike, or even prolonged negotiations, has the effect
of putting tremendous pressure on both sides to voluntarily settle
their differences through compromise, because both sides suffer
when dispute costs are high. 64 Under interest arbitration, the focus
shifts away from the negotiations and onto the arbitration as the real
event. 65 This shift destroys the potentially therapeutic aspect of the
60. See, e.g., David Bloom, Is Arbitration Really Compatible with Bargaining?, 20 INDUS.
REL. 233, 243 (1981); Janet Currie & Sheena McConnell, Collective Bargainingin the Public
Sector: The Effect of Legal Structure on Dispute Costs and Wages, 81 Am. ECoN. REv. 693, 693
(1991).
61. WEILER, supra note 57, at 250.
62. Peter Feuille, Selected Benefits and Costs of Compulsory Arbitration, 33 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REv. 64, 70 (1979).
63. See generally Weiler, Striking a New Balance, supra note 17, at 361-62.
64. Id. at 366.
65. See Developments in the Law-PublicEmployment, 97 HAtv. L. REv. 1611, 1710 (1984);
Howlett, supra note 34, at 820.
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bargaining process, corrodes the understanding that the parties build
in negotiations, and turns bargaining into an adversarial tribunal in
which the parties speak not to one another, but to the arbitrator. 6 6
Rather than simply aiding the illegally treated unions that its supporters in Congress mention, the EFCA may less frequently lead the
parties to establish a sensible bargaining posture with the employer,
knowing that the arbitrator will step in, split the difference, or do what
he or she otherwise thinks is reasonable. 67 Authors have pointed out
that the institution of compulsory arbitration has a "chilling" or "narcotic" effect on the parties by inducing them to rely on an arbitrator
rather than meaningful negotiations in their own interest. 68 One
study showed a low percentage of contract negotiations under compulsory arbitration laws that were completed without resort to either a
strike or the compulsory arbitration mechanism. 69 Of the five types of
jurisdictions mentioned in that study, those with compulsory interest
arbitration had the lowest instance of voluntarily negotiated agreement, at only 66%.7o The study's authors estimated that introducing
compulsory arbitration into a jurisdiction where there was already a
voluntary arbitration law increased the chances of the parties relying
on arbitration between 6% and 23%.71
An EFCA proponent might point out that the law does not
merely provide for compulsory first-contract arbitration, but also provides a mechanism for the parties to mediate their dispute with an
FMCS mediator. 72 As the argument goes, this provision of the EFCA
might cut into the number of disputes that would result in interest
arbitration. If the parties were at all apt to voluntarily settle their disputes, they would have the opportunity to do so and avoid arbitration
altogether. The FMCS's 2004 annual report, however, details its lack
of success in first-contract negotiations, which it acknowledges are
"critical because they are the foundation for the parties' future labormanagement relationship" and are "often more difficult than estab66. Developments in the Law, supra note 65; Howlett, supra note 34, at 820.
67. SeeJordan T.L. Halgas, Reach an Agreement or Else: Mandatory Arbitration Under the
California Agricultural Labor Relations Act, 14 SAN JOAQUIN AcRic. L. REV. 1, 30-36 (2004)
(appraising critically the recently-enacted California Agricultural Labor Relations Act,
which contains compulsory interest arbitration provisions).
68. Developments in the Law, supra note 65, at 1709-11 (stating that arbitration chills a
party's negotiating efforts and is narcotic because a party finds little use in negotiating
once it has experienced arbitration).
69. Currie & McConnell, supra note 41, at 532.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 539.
72. S. 1041, 110th Cong. § 3 (2007).

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

lished successor contract negotiations, since they frequently follow
contentious representation election campaigns. ' 7- Out of the 398 initial contract bargaining cases submitted to the FMCS in 2004 that
reached mediation, 181 (about 45%) were closed successfully (i.e., an
agreement was reached) .74 The percentage of non-mediated cases in
which collective bargaining agreements were reached was actually
higher, at almost 59%.75 In fact, the FMCS's success rate in first-contract arbitration mediations fell from 53% in 2000 to 45% in 2004.76
The FMCS has since discontinued publishing statistics on its success
77
rates in first-contract mediations in its annual reports.
The numbers and express statements from the FMCS highlight
the ineffectiveness of mediations in first-contract situations, especially
those that follow closely on the heels of a certification election, as is
the case with the EFCA. In general, effective mediators must take their
time, occasionally serve as a conduits for information exchanges between the parties, hold joint- and single-party sessions, and most importantly, gain the confidence of the parties. 78 The thirty-day
maximum that the EFCA allows for mediation, and the fact that parties may be weighing their chances of success under an arbitrator's
discretion, both dampen a mediator's chance for success.
III.

The Inapplicability and Inadequacy of Existing Federal
Judicial Review Standards in the Interest Arbitration
Context

Whatever the relative merits of these positions may be, the arguments both for and against interest arbitration point towards a common theme: compulsory interest arbitration will likely mean increased
reliance on government-appointed arbitrators to decide disputed issues. Because the EFCA is a government-imposed remedy, judicial review of an arbitrator's decision will be a major concern of parties
frustrated by the resulting contracts. The novelty of labor-manage73. FED. MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERV., ANNUAL REPORT 18 (2004), available at
http://fmcs.gov/assets/files/annual%20reports/FYO4_AnnualReportFINALI 13004.doc.
74. Id. at 18-19.
75. Id. at 19.
76. Id. at 18.
77.

See FED. MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERV., ANNUAL REPORT 6-10 (2007), available

at http://fmcs.gov/assets/files/annual%20reports/FY2007_Annual-Report.pdf.
78. See Donald H. Wollet & Robert H. Chanin, The Law and Practiceof Teacher Negotiations, in ARBITRATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 404-05 (Edwin R. Temple & Robert B.

Moberly eds., 1979).
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ment interest arbitration under federal law79 leaves open the question

of how courts should review compulsory interest arbitration awards.
The EFGA itself gives courts little or no guidance in deciding how
to review interest arbitrators' decisions, and the legislative debate does
little to clarify these important questions. Interest arbitrators appointed under the EFCA may have little experience in the industry,
region, or workplace whose law they purport to hand down. The
EFCA does not provide a mechanism by which the arbitrator can clarify the meaning of the provisions he or she has written, does not require that an award be explained or even written, and does not
require the arbitrator to discriminate between situations in which the
parties have agreed to all but a few sticky issues, and situations in
which there is wholesale disagreement as to all of the terms of the
agreement.8 0 The EFCA appears to give the arbitrator an unrestrained
freedom to set the terms and conditions of employment, without consideration of the economic realities of what the union or employer
require.
Accordingly, without significant amendments to the proposed
EFCA, or the adoption of additional regulation by the FMCS, compulsory interest arbitration awards cannot be effectively reviewed.8 1 While
models of federal court judicial review do exist, they will be ineffective
in facilitating effective review of interest arbitration awards without
amendment. There are two basic concerns. First, the concern is
whether these standards of review would be sufficiently restrictive or
deferential. While a generally restrictive standard of review will encourage frivolous appeals and prevent the arbitrator from bringing

79. Interest arbitration clauses are sometimes included in voluntarily agreed upon
collective bargaining agreements. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, Local Union
No. 2 v. McElroy's, Inc., 500 F.3d 1093, 1095-96 (10th Cir. 2007). These clauses require
interest arbitration of future collective bargaining agreements, and could be used to set
original terms in new areas of bargaining following an agreement on an initial collective
bargaining agreement, but before the initial agreement has expired. See id.
80. S. 1041, 110th Cong. § 3 (2007).
81. The ordinary presumption is that actions of administrative agencies, like the
FMCS's administration of interest arbitrations under the EFCA, will be subject to judicial
review. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2008) (providing that a person "adversely affected or aggrieved
by agency action.., is entitled to judicial review thereof'); see also Abbott Labs. v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967) ("The legislative material elucidating [the Administrative Procedure Act] manifests a congressional intention that [the Act] cover a broad spectrum of
administrative actions, and this Court has echoed that theme by noting that the Administrative Procedure Act's generous review provisions must be given a hospitable interpretation." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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creativity or expertise to the process,8 2 a generally deferential standard may make courts unable to respond to the scenario described in
this Comment's introduction, or lead to other results that abrogate
the public interest.8 3 Second, a related concern is what, if any, substantive or procedural considerations courts require of the individual
or body issuing the reviewed decision.
A.

Grievance Arbitration Under Pre-Existing Collective Bargaining
Agreements

Grievance arbitration, the arbitration of a dispute over some right
arising under the collective bargaining agreement, 84 is the kind of arbitration around which federal labor policy has coalesced. In United
Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,8 5 the Supreme
Court limited judicial review of the grievance arbitrator's decision to
the question of whether the arbitrator drew his decision from the essence of the contract or instead attempted to "dispense his own brand
of industrial justice. '8 6 If he or she complied with this limited requirement, his or her award would be upheld. The Court has since applied
this rationale and concluded that an arbitrator who makes an obvious
error of fact or fails to consider the evidence before him will not have
his or her award overturned if he interprets the contract and only the
contract.8 7 The Court has also looked to common-law principles of
public policy as a basis for overturning arbitrators' decisions.8 8 Such
policy "must be well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained
'by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general
82. See Charles Craver, TheJudicialEnforcement of Public Sector Interest Arbitration, 21 B.C.
L. REv. 557, 568, 572 (1980).
83. Craver, Public Sector Impasse, supra note 37, at 794.
84. Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in LaborRelations, 68 HAgv. L. REv. 999,
1007-08 (1955).
85. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
86. Id. at 597.
87. See Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 511 (2001) (holding that an arbitrator who failed to consider a letter dispositive of a collusion claim was not
overruled). But see AT&T Techs. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)
("[T]he question of arbitrability-whether a collective-bargaining agreement creates a
duty for the parties to arbitrate the particular grievance-is undeniably an issue forjudicial
determination."). To some extent, the Court abrogated the laissez-faire principle of unreviewability, holding that a court may examine the nature of the grievance to see if it
involves "continuing rights" under the contract and is therefore arbitrable. See Litton Fin.
Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 209 (1991).
88. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber Workers
of Am., 461 U.S. 757, 765-67 (1983) ("As with any contract... a court may not enforce a
collective-bargaining agreement that is contrary to public policy.").
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considerations of supposed public interests. "'8 9 Subsequent federal
court decisions, however, have tended to blur the line between vacating an award and disagreement with the public policy. 90
In Enterprise Wheel, 9 1 Justice Douglas identified two rationales in
reaching the conclusion that judicial review of grievance arbitration
should be limited.9 2 First, he considered the idea that the parties validly contracted for the right to arbitrate their disputes, and therefore
contracted for the arbitrator's decision. 93 Second, Douglas looked to
the public policy in favor of arbitration announced in the previous
Steelworkers cases: 9 4 the notion that the arbitrator requires the independence to consider claims a court might be unwilling to entertain 95 and
flexibility in crafting and spelling out a remedy. 96 The latter policy
extends even so far as to cover the arbitrator's decision to refuse to
author a written opinion in support of arbitral awards or orders that
contained "mere ambiguity which permits the inference that the arbitrator... exceeded his authority"; such awards were held in Enterprise
97
Wheel to be fully enforceable.
The policies and realities that shape judicial review of a grievance
arbitrator's decision do not carry over into the interest arbitration
context. The former dean of Yale Law School, Harry Shulman, analogized contracting parties to legislators, who must plan for any number
of possible future needs and arrangements between the parties:
The parties seek to foresee the multitude of variant situations that
might arise, the possible types of action that might then be available, the practicalities of each and their anticipated advantages or
disadvantages. Choice between the suggested possibilities is ren89. Id. at 766 (quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945)).
90. See, e.g., Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Local Union 204, Int'l Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, 834 F.2d 1424, 1427 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding that there was a dominant national
policy requiring strict adherence to nuclear safety rules). See generally Harry T. Edwards,
JudicialReview of Labor ArbitrationAwards: The Clash Between the Public Policy Exception and the
Duty to Bargain, 64 Cmii.-KENT L. REV. 3, 4-5 (1988) (discussing the danger of allowing
judges to fashion specific policy exceptions to the general non-intervention rule).
91. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599
(1960).
92. See David A. Wright, "Foreignto the Competence of the Courts" Versus "One Law For All":
LaborArbitrators'PowersandJudicialReview in the United States and Canada, 23 COMP. LAB. L.
& POL'YJ. 967, 975 (2002).
93. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 599.
94. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566-67, 569 (1960);
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578, 582
(1960).
95. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 567.
96. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 598.
97. Id. at 598-99.
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dered more difficult by the very process of bargaining and the expected subsequent administration of the bargain. The negotiations
are necessarily conducted by representatives removed in variant degrees from direct confrontation with the anticipated situations.
They act on the basis partly of their own experience and partly of
....
the more or less incomplete or clashing advice of constituents
98
The pressure for trade or compromise is ever present.
This laundry list of different considerations does not confront the
grievance arbitrator, confined as he or she is to the four corners of an
existing agreement. The grievance arbitrator is akin to ajudge orjury,
because his or her job is simply to interpret and apply an existing
agreement, not create the "essence" of the contract. Judicial review of
grievance arbitration awards is confined to the limited question of
whether he or she has fulfilled his or her duties to the parties. 99
However, the concerns Shulman lists are precisely the concerns
an interest arbitrator must consider if he or she is to create a document that can lead to a successful relationship between the parties.
While grievance arbitrators can draw from the history of relations between the parties, interest arbitrators under the EFCA often have a
primarily legal background, 10 0 and may have no prior knowledge of
the parties or their negotiations. 10 1 Ambiguities, while allowed for in
the grievance arbitrator's decision, may be the subject of litigation
and exploitation by a party who wishes to challenge the most natural
or intended reading of an arbitrator's award. 10 2 Thus, the deferential
policies which inform review of grievance arbitration awards are inapplicable in the interest arbitration context.
B.

Appellate Review of Agency Decisions

Because the EFCA delegates authority to the FMCS to carry out
first-contract interest arbitrations, the federal court standards for review of administrative decisions are the most logical judicial review
standards to apply to interest arbitration. This type ofjudicial review is
governed by the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"),' 10 3 which
designates a number of different standards judges may apply to administrative determinations, including de novo review, review of the
98. Shulman, supra note 84, at 1003-04.
99. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597-99.
100. Weiler, Striking a New Balance, supra note 17, at 377.
101. S. 1041, 110th Cong. § 3 (2007) (providing no mechanisms by which prior negotiations or mediations are recorded).
102. See Leroy Marceau, Drafting a Union Contract, in ARBITRATION AND CONFUcr REsOLUTiON, supra note 78, at 33-34.
103. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
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record for substantial evidence, and review of the decision for an
abuse of discretion. Despite the existence of several tests, courts and
scholars have acknowledged that the standards are inexact and allow
10 4
judges great latitude in reviewing agency decisions.
Substantial evidence is the standard normally used to review
agency determinations that involve fact finding. 10 5 Such agency decisions are only reversed where a reasonable mind, after review of the
10 6
entire record, would necessarily come to a different conclusion.
Substantial evidence is only required when there is a record made at
the proceeding. 10 7 Without a record, review for some evidence in support of the decision would be frustrated. 10 8 The Supreme Court has
suggested in dicta that where a procedure is "nonadjudicatory, quasilegislative" in nature, the substantial evidence standard is inappropri-

ate as well.10 9 In addition, an administrative decision reviewed for substantial evidence cannot be upheld on the sole ground that the
administrator had expertise in the subject of the dispute. 10
The minimum standard to be applied to any agency determination is the "arbitrary, capricious, or abuse of discretion" test."1 ' To
reverse a decision under this standard, the reviewing court "must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relet 2
vant factors and whether there has been a clear error ofjudgment."
Although narrower than substantial evidence, abuse of discretion still
104. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488-89 (1951) ("A formula for
judicial review of administrative action may afford grounds for certitude but cannot assure
certainty of application."); see also Robert Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators,Judges
andJuries:A ComparativeAnalysis, 58 HARV. L. REV. 70, 89 (1944) ("To define the difference
[between substantial evidence and abuse of discretion review] with exactness is a difficult
task; perhaps the distinction in result will be one of approach and attitude on the part of
the appellate judge.").
105. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (E) (2006) ("The reviewing court shall ... hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... unsupported by substantial
evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the
record of an agency hearing provided by statute . . ").
106. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992).
107. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E).
108. Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 96-97 (1981).
109. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971).
110. Bat. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. Co., 393 U.S. 87, 91-92 (1968);
Brand v. Miller, 487 F.3d 862, 868-69 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
111. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A); see also Block v. Pitney Bowes Inc., 952 F.2d 1450,1454 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (noting that section 706(2) (A) is a "catch-all" provision for agency decisions);
Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 376-77 (1998) (holding that
courts may require administrative decisions to be logical and rational, and to cite the legal
standard which they actually apply).
112. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416 (citations omitted).
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requires a "searching and careful" review of the record.'1"3 The "abuse
of discretion" test may in some cases lead to overturning a decision
that would otherwise be supported by substantial evidence. 1 4 Where
an administrator's ultimate decision rests primarily on a question of
fact or interpretation of fact that "'requires a high level of technical
expertise,"' the court will defer to "'the informed discretion of the
responsible federal agencies.'"115

Based on these considerations, it is unclear which standard courts
would use to evaluate interest arbitration decisions. Although interest
arbitrations clearly require a fact finder weigh the evidence and determine what weight should be accorded to it, courts may be more likely
to apply the more deferential abuse of discretion standard if they decide that EFCA-mandated arbitrators deal in specialized determinations that courts should not interfere with (though, as stated above,
interest arbitrators are not necessarily experts in the subject-matter of
a contractual dispute). 116 An interest arbitration involves a "quasi-legislative"' 1 7 or "quasi-judicial"' 1 8 act, rather than the application of law
to fact; however, these proceedings adjudicate a significant private
right, rather than a merely public function, and "it is generally understood that arbitrary and capricious review is applied most frequently
in cases involving judicial challenges to informal rulemakings," 19
1 20
such as licensing procedures.
As then-Judge Scalia said, "the distinction between the substantial
evidence test and the arbitrary or capricious test is 'largely semantic."'l1 One thing is clear, however: even under the most deferential
standard of review possible, courts will need a record of the arbitration proceedings in order to understand what happened and whether
the arbitrator considered the purpose of the arbitration and the con113. Id.
114. See Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 284
(1974) ("The District Court properly concluded that, though an agency's finding may be
supported by substantial evidence . . . it may nonetheless reflect arbitrary and capricious
action.").
115. Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989) (quoting Kleppe v.
Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976)).
116. Weiler, Striking a New Balance, supra note 17, at 377.
117. Craver, Public Sector Impasse, supra note 37, at 788 n.38.
118. Howlett, supra note 34, at 836.
119. HARRY T. EDWARDS & LINDA A. ELLIOT, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW 168 (2007).
120.

See, e.g., Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435

U.S. 519 (1978) (discussing nuclear power plant license); Greater Boston Television Corp.
v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (discussing broadcast license).
121. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citations omitted).
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tentions of the parties. A written record is essential to meaningful judicial review, 122 and the EFCA should require it. Even assuming a
court evaluated past precedent and determined that one or another
standard of review was clearly appropriate for judicial review, the important question of what specific considerations courts search for in
assessing a decision remains. The EFCA leaves arbitrators to choose
whatever rationales or policies they wish in justifying their decisions,
and thus there is "no meaningful standard against which to judge the
agency's exercise of discretion," a fact which threatens to render the
123
agency action unreviewable.
IV.

Canadian and State Law: Drawing from Two Established
Models of Interest Arbitration Award Review

Part III has revealed that federal courts cannot even begin to review interest arbitration awards under the EFCA without amending it.
This section presents two suggestions for amendments to the EFCA.
The first, drawn from Canadian administrative law, is that courts
should use a different standard of review depending upon the circumstances under which the interest arbitration occurs. The second suggestion, drawn from state law, is that arbitrators be required to
consider a set of substantive criteria in formulating the terms and conditions of an interest arbitration award.
A.

Canada's Flexible Approach to Judicial Review

Eight jurisdictions-British Columbia, Manitoba, Newfoundland,
Ontario, Prince Edward Island, Quebec, Saskatchewan, and the federal jurisdiction of Canada-provide for first-contract interest arbitra24
tion by the government, generally upon application by either party. 1
Unlike their American counterparts, 25 Canadian labor laws, which
are organized almost exclusively by province or territory, are subject
122. Brian J. Malloy, Binding Interest Arbitration in the Public Sector: A "New" Proposalfor
California and Beyond, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 245, 267 (2003).
123. Heckler v. Cheney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985). The APA provides a very limited
exception to judicial review for actions "'committed to agency discretion.' Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (quoting 5 U.S.C.
§ 701(a)(2) (1964)). This exception is "applicable in those rare instances where 'statutes
are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.'" Overton Park,
401 U.S. at 410 (quoting S. REP. No. 79-752, at 26 (1945)).
124. Block, supra note 18, at 45 (citing GEORGE W. ADAMS, CANADIAN LABOR LAw § 10134 to -140 (2d ed. 1994)).
125. In a survey done of nearly every compulsory interest arbitration scheme in the
United States, Anderson and Krause found only one state--Wisconsin-where the process
had been amended by statute. Anderson & Krause, supra note 33, at 158; see also Martin H.
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to "frequent amendments [to] prevent these laws from tilting too far
in the direction of any party for an extended period of time. ' 126 Be-

cause arbitration is often compulsory in Canada and performed by
administrative agencies, arbitral decisions are reviewed by courts in
12 7
the same way as other binding administrative decisions.
Until 1979, Canadian courts used the ground ofjurisdictional error to overturn an arbitrator's decisions on substantive grounds when
the court found that the arbitrator had applied the wrong legal test. 128
This poorly defined and heavily subjective idea was criticized as expansionist, interventionist, and detracting from the efficiency and expertise of the administrative agency involved. 129 The jurisdictional
paradigm was severely curtailed in Canadian Union of Public Employees,
Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corp.,130 when the Canada Supreme
Court determined that certain administrative decisions would be reviewed under a "patent unreasonableness" standard.' 3 ' In determining that a more fluid approach should be applied to decisions of a
public-sector labor relations board, the Court considered "the 'delicate balance' that the enabling legislation required the board to strike
between the need to maintain public services and collective bargaining, and the specialized nature of the legislation that the board had to
apply and interpret."' 3 2 The Court went on to enumerate the factors it
would consider in setting the standard of review in each case: "not
only the wording of the enactment conferring jurisdiction on the administrative tribunal, but the purpose of the statute creating the tribunal, the reason for its existence, the area of expertise of its members
and the nature of the problem before the tribunal."'13 3 After an analysis of these factors, known as the "pragmatic and functional" approach, the reviewing court sets upon a standard of review: either the

Malin, Labor Law Reform: Waitingfor Congress?, 69 CHI.-KEN-r L. REv. 277 (1993) (discussing
the need for amendments to the NLRA).
126. Block, supra note 18, at 43-44.
127. Wright, supra note 92, at 983.
128. Id. at 983-85.
129. See id.
130. [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227 (Can.).
131. Id. at 237; see also Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 214-16, 2008
SCC 9 (Can.), available at http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/2008/2008scc9/2008scc9.

pdf.
132. Lorne Sossin & Colleen M. Flood, The Contextual Turn: Iacobucci's Legacy and the
Standard of Review in Administrative Law, 57 U. TORo,-,-To L.J. 581, 585 (2007).
133. Local 298 v. Bibeault, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048, 1088 (Can.).
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patent unreasonableness standard, an intermediate "reasonableness
13 4
simpliciter" standard, or a correctness standard.
Two Canadian Supreme Court cases illustrate the interesting possibility of a different standard of review being applied to labor arbitrators' interpretations of collective agreements. In Dayco Ltd. v. CAW35
Canada,1
the Court reviewed the question of whether an arbitrator's
finding that a contractual obligation survived the expiration of the
agreement was owed deference, where a statute imported a clause into
the contract that arguably allowed the arbitrator to decide his own
jurisdiction. 36 The Court found the arbitrator was due little deference because an arbitrator's expertise "falls short of the wide ranging
policy-making function sometimes delegated to labour boards .... In

short, an arbitration board falls towards the lower end of the spectrum
of those administrative tribunals charged with policy deliberations to
which the courts should defer."13 7 In C.J.A., Local 579 v. Bradco Construction Ltd.,133 the statute that mandated grievance arbitration provided for "final settlement" of the grievance by the arbitrator, and
otherwise the issue was one of garden-variety contractual interpretation. 13 9 Because this activity fell within the arbitrator's expertise, the
Court applied the patent unreasonableness standard, and concluded
that since the arbitrator's decision was supported by some evidence, it
1
would not be reversed.

40

In addition to substantive fairness, Canadian law allows for reversal of administrative decisions on a variety of procedural fairness
grounds. The Canadian Supreme Court identified five "fairness factors" used in this determination: (1) the nature of the decision being
made and the process followed in making it; (2) the statutory scheme
guiding the agency from which appeal is taken; (3) the importance of
the decision to the individual given the nature of the right; (4) the
expectations of the individual given the nature of the administrative
proceeding; and (5) the expertise and considerations of the agency in
choosing their procedure. 1 4 1 Applying these factors, the Court held
134. Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1
S.C.R. 982, 1004-05 (Can.).
135. [1993] 2 S.C.R. 230 (Can.).
136. Id. at 240-45, 248-53.
137. Id. at 266.
138. [1993] 2 S.C.R. 316 (Can.).
139. Id. at 318.
140. Id. at 339, 349.
141. Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817,
838-40 (Can.).
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that while a written decision or oral hearing by an immigration agency
is not always required, a "reasonable apprehension of bias" in decision-making would overturn an agency's decision. 1 42 In addition, the
Court has overturned arbitrators' rulings on the basis of evidentiary
error, holding that an arbitrator's failure to consider "relevant evidence"' 43 or properly interpret 'just and sufficient cause" 14 4 were procedural errors.
Drawing from the Canadian experience, the standard of review
courts use should vary according to the expertise of the individual
arbitrator with respect to the complexity and type of the issues
presented. 14 5 Because the arbitrator may operate as fact-finder in
technical and unfamiliar areas, courts should not give EFCA arbitrators' judgment the deference automatically accorded to other agencies. 146 Indeed, even if the arbitrator or arbitrators were experts in a
given industry, a challenge to their award might involve routine matters, or it might involve matters of first impression. The terms of the
contract might set a precedent for wages and benefits in an emergent
field, or simply mirror contracts already established in the same field.
Consideration of the nature of the challenge, the context of the contract dispute, and policy implications will naturally shape how much
leeway courts can afford to give the arbitrator.
142. Id. at 830.
143. Syndicat des Employes Professionnels de l'Universite du Quebec a Trois-Rivieres
v. Universite du Quebec a Trois-Rivieres, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 471, 484 (Can.).
144. Cie Miniere Quebec Cartier v. Quebec, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1095, 1096 (Can.).
145. In addition, Canadian courts have approached appeals from administrative tribunals by individually analyzing each issue presented and applying a standard of review appropriate to the tribunal's expertise and mandate on that particular question. See, e.g., City
of Calgary v. ATCO Gas and Pipelines Ltd., [2006] 1 S.C.R. 140, 162-63, 2006 SCC 4
(Can.). This approach is seemingly implied by an inquiry that looks at the tribunal's expertise and the nature of the question (i.e., whether it is a question of law, of fact, a technical
question, etc.). However, the late Judge Iacobucci of the Canadian Supreme Court seems
to have regarded the application of a single standard of review to each appeal as more
appropriate. See Canadian Broad. Corp. v. Canada (Labour Relations Board), [1995] 1
S.C.R. 157, 209-10 (McLachlin, J., dissenting) ("While conceding that issues which are
clearly jurisdictional or involve statutory interpretation must be judged by the more stringent standard of correctness, (Judge lacobucci] nevertheless goes on to suggest that the
standard for 'the decision as a whole' must be patent unreasonability. 1, on the contrary,
see the functional test as question-specific. A single case may present several issues." (citation omitted)).
146. INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-17 (2002); New Eng. Health Care Employees
Union, Dist. 1199 v. NLRB, 448 F.3d 189, 193-94 (2d Cir. 2006). This suggests an alternative solution, however: create an intermediate expert administrative body (like the BIA or
the NLRB) that reviews labor boards' decisions, and allows court review of the intermediate body's decision. In that case, a lower level of judicial scrutiny would be appropriate.
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By the same token, a fluid concept of procedural fairness could
be used to help resolve questions of whether the arbitrator has overstepped her proper role in crafting an award. A wily arbitrator might
take it upon herself to rethink or reopen issues which were considered
settled before the arbitration. However, from another point of view,
the interest arbitrator needs to be able to consider every proposed
provision of the contract if she is to create a functional system for
employer-union relations and "not a mere collection of unrelated provisions." 147 A more experienced or expert arbitrator might be allowed
to reopen areas settled before arbitration in order to craft the fairest
possible award. As in Canada, an award might be overturned if a less
experienced arbitrator fails to consider evidence the court sees as especially relevant, which is a far stricter level of review than even substantial evidence review. 148 In short, a flexible approach to judicial
review allows courts to ensure not only that an individual arbitration
yields fair results, but that EFCA-mandated awards create a vast common-law that future arbitrators will look towards in shaping their own
awards.
B.

The Use of Substantive Standards in State-Level Judicial Review

A large number of states have interest arbitration statutes that apply to both the public and private sectors. Many of these statutes are
149
silent on the question of judicial review or the appeals process.
Courts have applied a due process rationale in requiring some judicial
review of the interest arbitrator's decision. 150 The seminal case in this
area is Mt. Saint Mary's Hospital v. Catherwood," I in which the New
York Court of Appeals held that the ordinary due process constraints
mandating judicial review of administrative decisions required judicial
147.

Leroy Marceau, Drafting a Union Contract, in ARBITRATION AND CONFLIcr RESOLU-

TION, supra note 78, at 34.

148. Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 377 (1998) (holding
that substantial evidence review "gives the agency the benefits of the doubt, since it requires not the degree of evidence which satisfies the court that the requisite fact exists, but
merely the degree which could satisfy a reasonable factfinder.").
149. Grodin, supra note 31, at 698 n.70.
150. See Div. 540, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Mercer Improvement Auth., 386 A.2d
1290, 1293-94 (N.J. 1978); City of Providence v. Fire Fighters, 305 A.2d 93, 95-96 (R.I.
1973); Bayscene Resident Negotiators v. Bayscene Mobilehome Park, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 626,
633-35 (Ct. App. 1993) ("Where a local rule has the effect of closing the courts to the
defaulting party making the decision of the arbitrator the final determination in the case,
the party is denied due process of law." (quoting Hebert v. Ham, 184 Cal. Rptr. 83, 86 (Ct.
App. 1982))).
151. 260 N.E.2d 508 (N.Y. 1970).
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scrutiny of interest arbitration awards.' 52 The court recognized that
interest arbitration awards were legislative or quasi-legislative acts, and
applied the arbitrary or capricious test to these decisions, equating it
with judicial review of acts of the Legislature itself. 153 Much more recently, the California Court of Appeal placed interest arbitration
awards squarely in the realm of quasi-legislative acts, and upheld the
arbitrary and capricious standard in reviewing awards under the Agri54
cultural Labor Relations Act.'
Many, if not most, state-level interest arbitration statutes include
substantive standards for the interest arbitrator to apply in creating
the interest arbitration award. 155 These standards have three functions. 156 First, they insulate the statutes from non-delegation challenges under state constitutions. 15 7 The basic constitutional concern
interest arbitration decisions raise is that they give legislative authority
to private individuals, who must somehow be made politically accountable. 158 Political accountability has also been achieved by creating an
administrative agency with responsibility for conducting arbitrations' 59 or reviewing the decisions of the arbitrator prior to court re-

view. 160 Second, standards allow the reviewing court to determine

152. Id. at 515-17; see Comment, Compulsory Arbitration: The Scope ofJudicialReview, 51
ST. JoHN'S L. REv. 604, 615-17 (1978).
153. Mt. Saint Marys, 260 N.E.2d at 517-18; see also Caso v. Coffey, 359 N.E.2d 683,
687-88 (N.Y. 1976).
154. Hess Collection Winery v. Agric. Labor Relations Bd., 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 609,
618-19, 621-22 (Ct. App. 2006). The statutory scheme provided for Board review of the
arbitrator's decision on whether it was clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious, and
court review on whether the Board abused its discretion or acted outside of its jurisdiction.
Id. at 621. For what it is worth, some laws, including New York's 1970 Taylor Law, mandate
a "substantial evidence" standard. See Anderson & Krause, supra note 33, at 176 (questioning whether there is any difference between these standards).
155. Howlett, supra note 34, at 832.
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., Salt Lake City v. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, Locals 1645, 593, 1654 & 2064,
563 P.2d 789 (Utah 1977); Harney v. Russo, 255 A.2d 560 (Pa. 1969); Fire Fighters Local
No. 946 v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295 (Wyo. 1968). The most vital challenges to compulsory interest arbitration laws themselves have concerned the non-delegation provisions of
many state constitutions. See Malloy, supra note 122, at 247-48; Craver, PublicSector Impasse,
supra note 37, at 789-90.
158. Craver, Public Sector Impasse, supra note 37, at 791. Although the principle of nondelegation exists under federal Constitutional law, it is disfavored, rarely applied, and satisfied by the mere existence of an "intelligible principle" in the enabling legislation. CATHERINE M. DONNELLY, DELEGATION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWER TO PRIVATE PARTIES 123-25
(2007).
159. Craver, supra note 82, at 565; see also Malloy, supra note 122, at 261.
160. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1164.3(a) (West 2008) (providing for review of the arbitrator's
decision where a provision of the agreement is: (1) unrelated to wages, hours, or other
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whether the action taken below was arbitrary or capricious. 16t Third,
they allow the parties to effectively prepare their case for the interest
arbitrator. 162 Typical of interest arbitration statutes is the Michigan
Police and Fireman's Arbitration Act, which lays out eight criteria for
the arbitrator to follow in shaping the award:
(a) The lawful authority of the employer.
(b) Stipulations of the parties.
(c) The interests and welfare of the public and the financial ability
of the unit of government to meet those costs.
(d) Comparison of the wages, hours, and conditions of . .. the
employees involved in the arbitration proceeding with the wages,
hours, and conditions of employment of other employees performing similar services and with other employees generally ....
(e) The average consumer prices for goods and services ....
(f) The overall compensation .

.

. received by the employees, in-

cluding direct wage compensation, vacations, holidays and other
excused time, insurance and pensions, medical and hospitalization
benefits, the continuity and stability of employment, and all other
benefits received.
(g) Changes in any of the foregoing circumstances during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings.
(h) Such other factors, not confined to the foregoing, which are
normally or traditionally taken into consideration in the determination of wages, hours and conditions of employment through voluntary collective bargaining, mediation, fact-finding, arbitration or
otherwise between
the parties, in the public service or in private
63
employment.'
Federal law substantive standards are an important way that Congress can assist the arbitrator in shaping an award, and allow courts to
effectively review interest arbitration awards. Abrogations by the arbitrator of statutorily-imposed scope or other standards can be effectively remedied by post-arbitration judicial review. 164 Because the
EFCA will cover disputes in a wide range of industries, substantive
standards should include criteria that have across-the-board applicability. A narrower set of criteria is more appropriate where the arbitration law regulates one particular industry, such as the Rhode Island
conditions of employment; (2) based upon a clearly erroneous finding of material fact; or
(3) arbitrary or capricious in light of the mediator's findings of fact).
161. City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Ass'n, 256 A.2d 206, 211 (R.I.
1969).
162. Howlett, supra note 34, at 832.
163. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.239(a)-(h) (West 2006). For a comparison of this
and other standards, see 2 ARVD
EMPLOYMENTr ARBITRATION
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DENACO, LABOR AND

§ 48.05 (2007).

164. Firefighters Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo, 526 P.2d 971, 976 n.6 (Cal. 1974) (citing
California cases); see also Sheriffs' Ass'n v. Milwaukee County, 221 N.W.2d 673 (Wis. 1974).
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Policeman's Arbitration Act.1 65 The Michigan statute directs the arbitrator to create an award encompassing all mandatory topics of bargaining, i.e., those which concern "wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment" 166 but no other topics. 167 The Michigan
statute also limits the arbitration's scope by allowing the parties to stip68
ulate to the issues which will be outside of the scope of arbitration.
At the same time, the existence of substantive standards should
allow the arbitrator to use her particular expertise in construing them,
rather than foreclosing discretion in their application. Appellate
courts should not attempt to define what every phrase or term within
a set of substantive standards means in a given context, or perhaps
even generally. The Michigan law, for example, leaves a great deal up
to the arbitrator's discretion, however, including who counts as a
"comparable" employer, what qualifies as an inability to pay,
and
whether the union's demands should figure into the arbitrator's
calculus.1 69
Conclusion
The EFCA is insufficient, on its own, to meet the needs of unions
and employers who would be affected by its compulsory arbitration
provisions. The drafters of the legislation have ignored the jurisprudence and research surrounding interest arbitration both at home
and abroad. This Comment suggests two major changes to the
EFCA-the use of a flexible standard of review and substantive standards-in order to balance the competing concerns of deference to
expertise and the proper role of the courts in preserving the integrity
of the arbitration process. Questions of judicial review, arbitral standards, and labor policy are enmeshed and inseparable from one another. Action by the courts is normally seen as a necessary evil to be
used sparingly, but the number of arbitrations that the EFCA contemplates warrants a systematic and efficient approach to judicial review
that gives courts a broad enough role to prevent unfairness, but one
that keeps judicial economy and arbitral discretion in mind.
165. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-9.2-10 (2008) (including "hazards of employment"
criterion).
166. MICH. ComP. LAws ANN. § 423.239(h); see also 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2008); NLRB v.
Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 742-43 (1962).
167. Grodin argues that while an arbitrator should not be forced to arbitrate nonmandatory topics of bargaining, it is unclear whether the arbitrator should be allowed to
put these provisions in the final agreement. Grodin, supra note 31, at 697.
168. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.239(a)-(h).
169. ANDERSON, KRAUSE & DENACO, supra note 163, § 48.05.

